These words in a recent comment about the problems in Myanmar gave Talleyrand pause:
Myanmar officially recognizes 135 ethnic minorities. Several of these ethnic minorities have taken up arms against the Myanmarese state since independence. The Tatmadaw’s claim that it is entitled to a political role because it has held the state together is not without basis. Recently, some armed ethnic minority groups have issued vaguely worded statements that could be interpreted as support for the anti-military demonstrators. These groups have their own agendas. If the Tatmadaw is seriously weakened, splits or, worst of all, is somehow dismantled, Myanmar could fragment and descend into civil war and chaos. We already have the sobering examples of Iraq, Syria, and Libya before us. The destabilizing effects of such a scenario would not be confined within Myanmar’s borders. (Let us remember that there are, in camps in Thailand, still a million or so refugees and their descendants from 1988.)
The author, an ex-diplomat from Singapore, may not be the best authority on the subject, but his speculation raises some important questions. How likely is the serious weakening of the Tatmadaw? Would it really lead to a civil war? How far would the civil war extend? What would the reactions of Thailand, India, and others be? In other words, how extensive and serious could the implosion of the Myanmar state become?
The author states that China and the United States are more or less sitting on their hands as regards Myanmar, each not wanting to give the other an edge. That’s odd. Perhaps forestalling even the distant possibility of a major regional conflict in Southeast Asia ought to bring the two quietly together.
Meanwhile several armed minority groups – ten out of nearly twenty major ones – have just united in support of the demonstrators.