The loud discussion about a ‘new cold war’ between China and the West, or part of what’s left of ‘The West’, is captivating for taking place at cross purposes to itself. The reason is that the discussion conflates two related but rather different subjects: what ‘China’ is, and what ‘China’ does.
Have a look at these two maps. The first is a depiction of the ‘Quad’ or anti-China political/military conglomeration underway.
The second is of the nomenclature of dumplings superimposed on the map of the Mongol Empire.
In the first map, Chinese power is finite, and contained (or constrained) from its maritime expression. In the second map, Chinese culture spreads freely, but mainly overland, in a different direction.
The implied definition of ‘China’ in both maps is an oversimplification. In the first, China’s power is growing but monolithic, with firm boundaries. In the second, ‘China’ could signify what was (and continues to be) a large, complex, multi-ethnic society whose amalgamating and assimilationist culture is impossible to contain or constrain, and in fact is often desired in ‘local’ expression.
There is an additional contrast: to the prevailing image of the Soviet Union that gave rise to the earlier cold war, a similar map notwithstanding. Back then, the belief was that Soviet power spread like Mongols on horseback and therefore had to be ‘contained’. The West didn’t give much thought to their being anything like a borscht-empire.
Can the two definitions of ‘China’ peacefully coexist? They do, in spite of their incompatibility, but probably not forever. The more important questions to answer are: Who shall decide which definition prevails? And which one will it be?