Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Beijing S.O.S.
There appears to be only one reason the American International Group was nationalized by the American government, and that is because its failure would have been so costly in Asia, particularly in China, that it would have seemed like the moral equivalent of war. AIG goes way back in Far East; CV Starr made his millions there, and Hank Greenberg performed similar wonders. Yet nostalgia is not at the root of the story. We all know how vulnerable the United States is to the Bank of China; one flick of the wrist could send US Treasury bills into a free fall. And so, as J.P. Morgan famously put it, we all come to prefer combination to competition. If the American financial system sees its way through the current crisis, it will have the Chinese, and some creative Sino-American diplomacy, to thank for it.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Playing with Fire
During the past few days the actions of Mr. McCain and his presidential campaign have resembled nothing less than guerrilla warfare. One man’s stuntsmanship is of course another man’s insurgency. At the very least, McCain seems to have mastered the element of surprise against what would seem, now in retrospect, to be his opponent’s intricately planned—and therefore slow to adapt—campaign. Mr. Obama would do well to invest in some defoliants.
It is impolite to ask what the costs will be of a guerrilla election to the United States or to the American people. Only time will tell. A more interesting question is the one regarding patriotism. If we think about what the USA did for/to each candidate over the course of his life, we begin to wonder which he loves more: the idea of his country or the country itself?
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
More Office Pool
Talleyrand carries on with his speculation…
Scenario B: McCain Victory
Secretary of State: Joe Lieberman
Secretary of Defense: Colin Powell or Richard Armitage
National Security Adviser: Robert Kimmitt
White House Chief of Staff: Randy Scheunemann
Chairman, JCS: David Petraeus
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
The Yellow Peril Redux
The Bush administration could not leave office, of course, without one final salvo against the mounting military threat from China. How long ago it seems that China, the presumptive “peer competitor,” was its top national security priority. Mr. Wolfowitz, who chairs the official group that produced this latest report, is a tenacious and persistent man. As to China’s ambitions in military spending and modernization, the report is probably not far off the mark; as to its aims vis à vis the United States, well, this is a different question and depends as much on what the USA and its regional allies, namely Japan and Taiwan, seek as on China’s own rather predictable desires for regional supremacy.
The question is less one of an inevitable or even likely clash than it is one of cost-benefit. How high a price will the United States and the others pay to “contain” China, or even give the impression of doing so? How high a price will China pay to thwart its adversaries, both real and imagined?
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Russian Roulette
Every now and then Talleyrand finds himself privy to a useful bit of information. Here is one: The Russian government is banking hard on a long-term stake in the European energy distribution system and has geared much of its foreign policy toward that end, not to mention its domestic policy—one of the reasons, perhaps the main reason, that Mikhail Khodorkovsky was imprisoned, for example, was because he reportedly was on the verge of selling Yukos to Exxon/Mobil.
The Russian plan includes, paradoxically, acquiescing (or worse) to Iran’s nuclear program because it has convinced itself (or has been convinced) that Iran is waiting until that program is online before going full speed ahead with its plans for gas export, much of which would presumably transit Russia. Russia along with Iran possesses the largest natural gas reserves in the world. In the words of one well-informed Russian, neither the Americans nor anyone else will dare to intimidate the Iranians once they become a clear-cut nuclear power, which, among other things, will put an end to all the half-baked efforts to exclude it from the most lucrative Eurasian energy markets; and this is only a matter of time.
For their part, European governments needn’t be worried. Indeed, they should support Iran’s nuclear ambitions, according to the Russians, for the simple reason that doing so will ultimately lessen the Russian monopoly over their energy supplies. Now, this certainly is a strange argument. But it continues to be touted by eminent Russians.
Monday, October 6, 2008
More Proxy Wars
The focus of American public opinion now shifts back to Afghanistan, as though its oddly named “war on terror” were a zig zag centered somewhere over Tehran. Indeed, Iran still holds many cards in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as it does elsewhere in that part of the world.
It is sad then to read about people in Washington obsessed with arguing overthe number of troops on a pinhead: where do we send more “to get the job done”? This really is the wrong question.
To put it all simplistically, the Americans and their Iraqi allies to date have been fighting a proxy war against Iran in Iraq with one hand tied behind their back by Sunni insurgents. The USA and NATO now risk worsening an even tougher proxy war in Afghanistan against Sunni hardliners based in and around Pakistan. Here again, they will do so with one hand tied behind their backs—this time by Iran and its own Afghan proxies and by NATO’s own ambivalence over getting sucked deeper into the maze of Pushtun tribal politics.
To this end, Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship poses a gift to the West since the spectre of a nuclear Iran mobilizes all non-Iranians in the Middle East, for better or worse, and places them momentarily and rhetorically on the side of Europe and America. A more creative strategy, then, would do its utmost to play the various sides off one another, keeping in mind that holding their regional vassals in line is as important to many of the men who run Iran as are fantasies of nuclear hegemony.
On the ground this means flipping the Afghan balance on its head: NATO should resist the urge to escalate the conflict with the resurgent Taliban in Helmand and elsewhere, and should instead dangle the prospect of a wider and tougher civil war to persuade the Iranians to step up their own commitment to proxies in other parts of the country so long as they help to mitigate the Taliban resurgence, a prospect that no doubt would not be unpopular in Tehran, not to mention in Herat or Kabul. This would mean in essence the US not only tying a Pakistani hand behind Iranian interests in Afghanistan but also tying an Iranian hand behind the backs of the Taliban in an effort to compel them to 1. change their name and become responsible political players and 2. hand over a respectable number of their most notorious jihadist allies.
Talleyrand is not so experienced with the lands of the East or at least his humility in this instance exceeds his natural deviousness, and so all of the above should be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, such an approach is certainly more attractive than the status quo, which is beginning to see defeat written all over it.
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Panic in Pakistan
The times have really changed when the President of Pakistan goes to China, hat in hand, to ask for a desperate bail out and is turned away because, according to a Chinese official, “We have done our due diligence, and it isn’t happening.”
So much for client statehood. During the latter Cold War, China propped up Pakistan, especially Pakistan’s army, as leverage against their mutual Indian rival. This rationale was lost, first with the demise of the Soviet Union and then with the entrance of both Pakistan and India into the club of nuclear weapons states. Feeding an armed rivalry in which either side could destroy large parts of the other in a matter of minutes no longer seemed to be in anyone’s interest, least of all China’s, which has bigger things to worry about these days. In any event, Pakistan’s governments have stridden the insurgent fence a bit too much for China’s liking, given the Islamist tendencies of a few radicals just up the Karakoram Highway in Xinjiang. The end of this particular alliance, then, was long overdue.
But the rejection seems more than a mere snub. Perhaps China is sending a message to other would-be supplicants: don’t take anything for granted. As to poor Pakistan, which has only enough reserves to last about two months, it must appear on its knees before the IMF and take whatever it can get. Which raises the question: aren’t there any more suitable sugar daddies out there? A few clever Indians might do well to make their neighbors a modest offer they cannot refuse.
Friday, October 17, 2008
Endorsements Galore
The latest campaign rumors place General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.) on the verge of announcing a presidential endorsement this coming weekend. The bets are on Obama, despite Powell’s long service to predominantly Republican administrations and his acquaintance with John McCain. In the past, Powell has said he is offering advice to both campaigns but would not endorse either one
What are we to take from the latest bit of coyness of this formidable careerist? Talleyrand has already speculated that Powell would accept a cabinet position, probably Secretary of Defense, in a McCain administration. It sounded far-fetched to some but it would be McCain’s most serious gesture to demonstrate his departure from the Bush years, as well as a balance against the likely prominence of Joe Lieberman and other neoconservatives in a McCain administration.
Powell, however, seems to be jumping the gun. There can be little doubt that, like his hero General George Marshall, he wants to end his public career at the Pentagon. At the very least this would redeem Powell’s disappointing tenure as Secretary of State. If he now casts his lot with Obama, can we expect a quo will follow the quid? Well, of course not—Powell is thinking only of what is best for the country, no more, no less. Far be it from this cynic to assume anything else.
Saturday, November 1, 2008
Making History
Talleyrand is thinking of his American friends as they stand on the eve of what they consider to be the most important presidential election in decades. If they go ahead and choose Obama as predicted, the goodwill of the world will surely come their way. But how long will it last? The so-called honeymoon question is the one everyone seems to be asking. But it is not the one that most worries Talleyrand.
Obama’s biggest headaches will probably happen at home. Especially if his party continues to control the Congress and an increasing number of state legislatures. Americans don’t stand a single-party state for very long: just ask the Republicans who controlled the Congress under George Bush. A partial or even serious reversal of the Democratic Party’s fortunes with the mid-term elections in 2010 may not be such a bad thing for Obama.
What happens domestically between now and then is another story. This campaign has brought out some of the ugliest aspects of American politics, even more than usual. Sealing them back up in their bottles will take a great deal of effort—political, moral, spiritual and symbolic. And it won’t be helped by an angry, divided and resentful Republican minority with very little power for the first time in many years.
For all that sober Democrats urge Obama to remain mindful of 9-11 and the many threats around the world, he would also do well to keep another flash card visible on his desk: remember Oklahoma City. It is not a happy burden.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
The Global President
With so much of the world rejoicing in the recent victory of Barack Obama, there can be little doubt that his administration will want to send an early signal of “change” by taking a world tour soon after (or even before) entering office. Traditionally most presidents have taken their first foreign trips to Canada or another country in the Western Hemisphere; although some, like Nixon, have made dramatic debuts in Europe. (Having been attacked with bottles, rocks and all manner of street debris during a trip to Latin America in 1958, he probably was not keen to repeat the experience.)
The 60th anniversary of NATO will happen next April, and Obama’s voyage to the capitals of Europe would send an important signal—repairing relationships with old allies is job number one. But count on him to go somewhere else beforehand, or better yet, simultaneously. Obama already has become known for displaying a dexterous mix of discipline and audacity. Yes, pay homage to the old guard in Old Europe: but keep on going—to Asia, to Africa, to the Americas—on behalf of a different commemoration: the centenary of the voyage of the Great White Fleet around the world.
An inaugural circumnavigation: what more fitting symbol of the man and the times?
Saturday, November 15, 2008
Madame Secretary, Part 3?
Talleyrand concurs with the balance of commentary on the suspected appointment of Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State: It was a shrewd move by Obama. But he does not like the analogy to Secretary Seward in the Lincoln administration.
It had long been a tradition for political rivals to occupy the position of Secretary of State: this was not Lincoln’s masterful invention, and the two were often badly at odds. Seward very nearly started a war with England in the middle of the Civil War.
One doubts whether the United States can afford this kind of rivalry in the 21st century. Since World War II the only successful Secretaries of State have been those whose views and loyalties were fully shared by the president. Obama may want to send a clear signal that he intends to be his own foreign minister, as he has every right to do. But then Clinton would be foolish to put herself in that position.
Monday, November 10, 2008
Sins of Omission
John F. Kennedy claimed—infamously—that President Eisenhower never mentioned anything about Vietnam to him during their long talk together before Kennedy’s inauguration. Rather, Ike was obsessed with Laos. And so was Kennedy for the first few months of his administration, and failed to anticipate an even greater crisis for the United States next door.
Reportedly Bill Clinton told George W. Bush that he did all he could to kill Osama bin Laden. Judging by the Bush administration’s list of priorities in 2001, Clinton’s statement did not make a very deep impression.
What will Bush tell Obama today when they meet in the White House? What will he warn him against? Which parts of the world will he emphasize? Which foreigners—friends, foes, or both—will he tell Obama to watch out for?
Whatever Bush says, it is likely that he will leave out—probably inadvertently—the most salient information. Any lucky flies on the wall should be sure to make note of what is not said between the two.
Monday, December 22, 2008
Pyongyang Mystery
Talleyrand is surprised to find so little being reported about the apparent failure of the North Korean disarmament negotiations. After having been touted as a triumph of patient diplomacy, the deal seems to have foundered over the issue of verification. This represents a sad disappointment for George W. Bush especially, because the deal had been touted, with the partial exception of Libya, as his only major diplomatic achievement in the field of disarmament—one he evidently cared so much about that it underwrote his decision to invade and occupy another country.
Korea was spared this indignity; so why are they now being so obstructive? Given the rumors of Kim Jong Il’s ill health, it is perhaps the case that nobody is really in charge, hence the stalled negotiations. Or, the Koreans may be unwilling to sign a deal with a lame duck Bush administration, perhaps anticipating better fortune come January.
They are unlikely to be so foolish. Bush has pursued the deal with a determination—some would say desperation—that will not last, no matter how much Obama seeks to preserve continuity in this area. And ever since Nixon went to China, it has been Democratic administrations which have been the more hawkish, at least in Asia, and generally friendlier toward Japan, whose relations with the Koreans at this point in time are at their worst in decades. Finally, an accommodationist critique from the Right is almost inevitable to emerge during the course of the Obama administration. The last thing he will want on his plate is an imperfect deal on verification in Korea, no matter how much of it was negotiated on Bush’s watch.
One has to wonder, then, if the North Koreans have some other plan up their sleeve…
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Fiddling Whilst We Burn
Talleyrand regrets to inform his readers that he will not be among the distinguished visitors to Davos this coming week. It is not because he is unwelcome in Switzerland but rather because he can see almost nothing useful coming out of this year's august Alpine pow wow. What shall the masters of the universe discuss this time? It is not too difficult to predict the lines of conversation. Some will take credit for having predicted the global economic mess we’re all in. Some will say it will get worse. Others will say it will get much worse. Others will emphasize silver linings. Almost no one, probably, will reveal a truly original and useful plan or sentiment. Most of the discussion will likely center around whether this crash is something new and different, or whether it is just part of the usual cycle… plus, of course, whatever tidbits of gossip the participants cannot resist sharing about the new team in Washington.
All things considered, you might wonder whether the Davosards would ever consider saving their pennies and staying home this year. Not at all. We must all spend our way out of this crisis, and those with the most ought spend the most!
Monday, February 2, 2009
Double, Triple Tracking
The new American administration has lost little time in hinting that it will make good on its promises to launch dialogues with some of America’s best known enemies. Iran and Syria stand at the top of the list, and we now are hearing about ongoing “track II” discussions with governments in both countries.
Talleyrand may be accused fairly of traditionalism in his preference for the Old Diplomacy, secret or otherwise. He finds the track II business rather confusing. It has long been a practice of governments to send quiet emissaries outside the usual channels if the need arose. But then why are they allowed to publicize their work so soon after the fact? Doesn’t it defeat the whole purpose of having quiet discussions, sub rosa?
One begins to suspect the work of a master dissembler. First Obama appoints his chief political rival to head the State Department; then come the high profile “special envoys” with promises of more on the way; followed by these semi-official dialogues, all well leaked. What will be next? A juggler with hidden hands may work miracles. But when he drops a ball, the consequences of mixed messages could be dire.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Agonising Reappraisals
Talleyrand has returned from a most august gathering where he found himself sitting between two people from countries he shall not name. The subject for discussion was very close to his heart, namely, the ‘future of Europe.’ The European continent, he learned, continues to “expand,” not only eastward but also to the north, although not really to the south.
Let him be more precise: it was predicted that Iceland, and possibly someday Norway, would be most welcome into the European Union, as would the next round of candidates from the former Eastern bloc—the “Western Balkan” states of the former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, which is already in. These states are already surrounded by the European Union so it makes little sense to keep them out any longer.
Further to the east the question becomes murkier. Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the states in the Southern Caucasus lie on some distant list in somebody’s drawer in Brussels. Russia most certainly does not. Nor does Israel, which, Talleyrand was surprised to learn, sent at one point a tentative proposal for membership and considered offering Jordan along with itself.
But the most contentious country of all is Turkey. For the past twenty years that proud country has knocked at Europe’s door (preferable, of course, to knocking it down, which it also tried once before). Time after time it has been presented with further conditions, more accession talks. The Turk is patient. For though he may be unsure of his own country’s destiny he surely knows that he will be in a position to make Europe an offer she cannot refuse.
What will it be? The person from country X, on Talleyrand’s left, pointed out that Turkey’s population dwarfs that of any other in Europe; should it ever enter the EU, it would be the largest country by far. The person from country Y, on Talleyrand’s right, added that, even putting aside Turkey’s “vicious” history, it was full of all manner of undersirables and shares borders with Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. No, Turkey is most decidedly not European.
Is Turkey really any less a part of Europe than Spain (how soon we forget that Africa no longer begins at the Pyrenees), Malta or Cyprus? Like so many of these discussions, the main point is lost amid varying efforts to conceal cultural and historical biases and overlook the fact that Europe, or any other continent, for that matter, is first and foremost a geopolitical entity.
In fact, such talk is a luxury that Talleyrand fears will not last much longer. For someday in the not too distant future, the dear Americans who have been subsidising the defense of Europe may tire of the burden. And the Europeans, whoever they may then be, will find the precious Union terribly vulnerable.
At this point the wiser Europeans may very well want a positive association, and maybe an institutional relationship, with the world’s third largest (and probably its toughest) army. Or, for that matter, why not Russia as well, with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal? Or would Europe really prefer to see one or both powers excluded permanently from its noble society?
Sunday, March 1, 2009
World Turned Upside Down
Today’s global economic crisis has left many people—even the best informed—scratching their heads. About six months ago some said it was part of a ‘necessary’ recession. Then, once the financial crisis began to spread quickly into the overall economy, first in the US, then to Europe and Asia, it became clear that this was no ordinary recession. No longer are the experts speaking of a crisis of liquidity. It now seems to be a classic crisis of solvency. How many more banks will fail? How many more governments will fall?
Those with capital flock to imaginary safe havens. The rest of us flock to gurus. Krugman and Roubini have replaced Buffett, Gates, Gerstner and Welch. Rubin has disappeared from public view; Greenspan is coming to resemble Robert McNamara with his stream of feeble defenses and half-hearted confessions; Summers has done his best to jump to the other side of the fence. And where is Jude Wanniski when we need him most? Alas, he passed away three years ago.
Here is a thought: risk specialists tell us that relative safety is found in diversification. But this is proving to be misguided in this instance—assets we thought were well diversified turn out to all be linked to one another, and have collapsed accordingly, like proverbial dominoes. It is similar, in a way, to the long cherished doctrine of redundancy in nuclear defense. The Soviets buried their best weapons under miles of concrete bunkers. NATO spread its best weapons all over the place in the assumption that a second, or even third, strike would be possible no matter what, and that a nuclear war could therefore be won.
Whether they really meant it is another question, but it sure made the Soviets dig even deeper and pour even more concrete. Redundancy must have paid off. But since then ‘threat analysis’ has assumed the opposite, at least so far as the other guys are concerned—the more widespread a threat is, the greater its potential to inflict harm.
Are risks going the way of threats? Is this what the 1990s, culminating in 9/11 and now economic meltdown, have left behind?
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Diplomatic Scapegoats and Martyrs
The objections to the appointment of Ambassador Chris Hill to Baghdad are quite rich in the wake of America’s mini-Dreyfus Affair over the appointment of Chas Freeman to head the National Intelligence Council.
Senators McCain, Brownback and Graham are objecting to Hill’s lack of Middle East background. Hill is one of the United States’ most experienced diplomats and has served very well in many posts around the world. That’s the whole point of having a professional diplomatic service.
Of course it was Ambassador Freeman’s own experience and interest in the Middle East, or more precisely, his opinions about Israel, that did him in. Every single Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee signed a statement of objection to his appointment, even though it wasn’t even in the confirmable category.
So, do the Americans want their senior officials to be neophytes or not? Or maybe they just want to clone Dennis Ross.
To be fair [sic], we must note a few other agendas at play in Hill’s case. The Senators object to his handling of the North Korean negotiations. But surely he was doing the bidding of his bosses. Do they assert him to have been disloyal? Should he have been less effective?
The Senators also may be hitting back at the Obama administration for its clumsy handling of the near-nomination of General Anthony Zinni to Iraq. But if they really are objecting to consent minus advice, then they should clearly state so rather than taking it out on the nominee.
It’s no wonder that much American diplomacy is conducted nowadays by colonels, major generals, spooks and “special envoys.”
Advice from a French friend: the people’s representatives should start taking their duties more seriously; or they should just change the Constitution and get out of the way.
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Behind and Between the Lines
The most immediately striking thing about Barack Obama’s appearance today with the nominal leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan was his deliberate singling out of Al Qaeda and no mention of the Taliban, at least by name. Yet the US continues to fight Taliban and Taliban-allied militias in Afghanistan, while the insurgents that the mainstream press has depicted as some kind of yellow horde, or infidels at the gates of Vienna, now reportedly “just sixty miles” from Islamabad, also call themselves the Taliban.
If precedents and personalities give us anything to go on, we can only suspect that a whole lot of deals are in the process of being cut.
Saturday, July 11, 2009
Shades of Dignity
A favorite topic lately is the American president Obama's restoration of dignity to his office. Nobody can dispute this. He is certainly more poised, more graceful, more elegant than either of his two predecessors. But is he more formidable? That is a different, more important, question.
Americans have a strange, seemingly paradoxical, taste in leaders. They like those who stand above them but who also possess the common touch. That is why both Roosevelts and Kennedy succeeded to captivate their country while countless others in the Jimmy Carter mode, failed. And it is why George W. Bush, who seemed to be play acting most of the time, had his moment in the sun while visiting the downed towers in New York. When he grabbed the bullhorn, put his arm around the fireman and shouted to the crowd, he seemed genuinely to mean what he said. He was, for one brief moment, one with his people.
Obama inspires and moves but he does not touch. He rarely connects or “feels.” All leaders have an Achilles’ heel and Obama’s is aloofness. There is nothing he can do about it; it is part of his character. He would do well to continue being himself. But this means the burden on him to succeed with deeds is ever greater, no matter how dignified their presentation.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Light Summer Reading
Whenever Talleyrand’s colleagues over at the Swoop repeat that all will be relatively quiet on the foreign policy front while domestic priorities remain front and center, he usually suspects a setup. August can be a cruel month in the Situation Room. Our own sources tell us that the mounting violence in Iraq will pick up steadily, possibly dramatically in the coming weeks. And beware surprises elsewhere closer to home.
Sunday, July 19, 2009
The Burdens of Friendship
One of the most difficult things about being a great power is managing relationships with friends and allies. They can make life awkward, even dangerous, especially if they have touchy relations with one another, or with the friends of one’s enemy. Many a war has been started or threatened by mixed messages being sent among these so-called second tier powers. Witness Corinth, Poland and, most recently, Georgia.
The problem now is especially acute for the United States as it evolves from a superpower to a great power. The former condition is easier. Friendships are rougher to manage when the overall logic of the relationship is in flux. Perceptions of prestige rule.
Thus it is no surprise that both the Israelis and the Saudis are broadcasting displeasure with their American ally. Everyone seems to feel slighted, even Barack Obama, reportedly, by his own staff.
Talleyrand knows one thing: playing evenhanded won’t solve anything. It just makes everyone mad at you.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Nippon Bomb
Sol Sanders, one of Talleyrand’s all-time journalistic heroes, has just posted a first-rate piece about Japan and nuclear weapons. He is quite right. It makes good sense for Japan to have these weapons, and it’s only a matter of time before they cast off the nuclear taboo. Unlike other would-be nuclear powers (Iran, for example), this is not a simple case of overblown prestige or imperialism (Japan has been there, done that). Japan genuinely is vulnerable and is finding its US protector less & less reliable. Its geography and interests demand a strong deterrent. But most of all, the Japanese—and the world—have changed. Not too long ago on a trip to Japan, a young man took Talleyrand aside and said, “stop listening to these old guys, My generation doesn’t share their taboos. Don’t forget it.” If anything is certain about the Japanese, this is it: they tend to mean what they say.
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
Afghanistan--Where's the Diplomacy?
The great debate about Afghanistan begins, again. Like most things in the American adversarial tradition, it has only two sides: more troops or fewer? Bombs or boots on the ground? Guns or butter?
How tedious, predictable and simple-minded. Meanwhile the chorus of Afghanists overlooks the central point about this conflict, and stability as a whole in this region. It does matter to the United States because it matters to all of Afghanistan’s bigger neighbors. So where is the diplomacy? Those who place great faith in Mr. Holbrooke can be sure it’s happening in private at a feverish pace.
But the public message matters, too. Why isn’t Hilary Clinton making appearances with her counterparts across Central Asia in order to show solidarity for peace and good governance in Afghanistan? Where is the “contact group” for this country that some people say is so important. Where is the steady, deepening and widening pattern of consultation that the US desperately needs, no matter which course it chooses inside the country.
General George Marshall once said, “if you give a problem to the military to solve, you’ll get a military solution.” Don’t be surprised if this one doesn’t turn out as planned.