Thursday, April 24, 2008
Nuclear Korea
The hand wringing over North Korea’s nuclear exhibitionism begins anew this week. The Americans' Director of Central Intelligence, General Michael Hayden, testifies soon in Congress about Pyongyang’s illicit dealings with Syria and others. Christopher Hill, the indefatigable State Department negotiator, continues his shuttle diplomacy, nudging the Koreans closer to making the ultimate clean break. Whose tail is wagging the dog? This is the perennial question.
We allow ourselves to digress and note that most of the experts on this question were once ‘political scientists.’ As such, they have been well trained to make and follow assumptions about individual and collective behavior based on theoretical models. For example, Saddam Hussein was typecast as a classic revisionist dictator, determined to rule his part of the world by whatever means necessary. Like Hitler and Stalin, he could not be appeased, so better to get rid of him while he was weak. The North Koreans and their strange leader, by contrast, are depicted as mere extortionists. They will keep driving up their side of the bargain in order to gain time for ‘regime survival.’
Talleyrand, who also regards himself as a student of human nature, wonders whether the experts might have got it backwards. He has no secret or special basis for knowing one way or the other. But he cannot resist posing the question: what if the North Koreans have something more in mind than survival? What if their long, tragic and violent history tells them, too, that one must grow or die? What if−to suggest a radical notion−an ambition of Kim Jong Il is to start an even bigger and better war than the one begun by his father? After all, the Korean War was a major boost to the global militarization of the Cold War. Try to imagine what a second Korean war would do, especially if it destroyed the fragile harmony among China, Japan, Russia and the United States? This time they might all emerge as losers. What sweet revenge that would be.
This is why the Americans and others have no choice but to keep stringing along the North Koreans, tapping them on the knuckles every time they misbehave. But they should do it with their eyes wide open, and prepare for the worst.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Fence Sitters
The United States presides over a world of fence sitters. We recall that the Americans’ own Revolution barely succeeded with only about a third of the population in favor of independence. “With us or against us” has always been little more than a rhetorical device; even during the toughest years of the Cold War, a good part of the world watched and waited to see which side would command the future while the rest perfected the art of playing one side off the other.
Things are not so different today. And yet a new crop of Spenglerian prophets has arisen, telling us that China, India (but alas, no longer Europe or Japan) are bound to overtake the West. Just short of a generation since the Soviet Union breathed its last gasp, the Cassandras of “imperial overstretch” are hitting their originally intended target: the USA. In the meantime, would-be client states are having second, third and even fourth thoughts. Ecuador’s government announces the US must close its military base, the largest in the region. Uzbekistan’s government seems to be inviting the Americans back after inviting them to leave in 2005. But at home, insisting that the United States is "bound to lead" still remains de rigueur.
To most Americans, neutralism carries a whiff of dishonor. Americans like certainty, road maps, optimistic scenarios. Ambivalence is best understood as a temporary condition, something to be overcome, like injustice or misfortune, or lasting only until the next election cycle. But as confident as many people may be that 2009 will prove salutary, much of the rest of the world lingers on in confusion.
Friday, May 2, 2008
Cuba Libre?
Why do Americans have such a soft spot for Cuba? Why does this Caribbean island seem so special, so alluring…almost obsessive? Why, in other words, has tiny Cuba mattered so much?
It is a curious question. That Fidel Castro facilitated what nearly became an all-out hot war between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 is not the only reason. That incident was merely symptomatic of a perverse relationship. Where else could such a crisis happen but in Cuba? (If it had happened in, instead of over, Berlin, the Americans would have been the ones who had to back down.) Where else could a Jesuit lawyer rule over twelve million people for over fifty years but ninety miles off the United States coast?
Cuba has enticed the United States for much longer than the past half-century. It has brought out the best and the worst of the American character. It was the so-called war for Cuban independence in 1898 that brought the United States its first overseas colonies, and gave it the veneer of a serious naval power, which is what counted back then. Henry James was not the only one who warned that empire may have civilized the British but would only demoralize the Americans.
The Cubans have paid a high price for it. Yet, finally, it seems they may be nearing the end of a long anti-American era. Cubans are awakening to the consumer culture: they may buy computers and many other kinds of hitherto banned appliances, including cellphones; they may own cars, earn profits off their crops, even enter the sanctified ground of tourist hotels. Under their new president, brother Raul, Cubans finally are beginning to taste what the modern world calls freedom.
None of this should surprise us. Several years ago Fidel Castro asked a visiting Chilean, “how did Pinochet do it?” By that he meant, how do I cede power while still holding on to it? Castro’s enemies long ago convinced their supporters in the United States that the old revolutionary wanted to die with his boots on, that he could (and probably would) provoke one crisis after another until his wretched soul left this earth.
Perhaps they may still be proved right. On the other hand, we know that Castro has long admired his fellow Galician, Francisco Franco, who died peacefully in his bed while his country “in transition” carried on much as before. Franco was a lucky man, and had a king (and the United States, indirectly) to serve as his handmaid. Castro is not so fortunate; he had counted on the Catholic Church to play that role, but it seemed that the last pope proved just too popular. Fidel was upstaged. Again, he retreated.
Alas, it seems that poor, undistinguished Raul now must be Cuba’s King Juan Carlos. Fidel meanwhile is doing is best to imitate Deng Xiaoping, lingering on for as long as he can. A remarkable tactician, even in his dotage, he may pull it off. Or he may not. For once, it may be the Cuban people who decide the fate of their island.
Monday, April 28, 2008
Restorations
Talleyrand knows a thing or two about restorations. Still, he has been surprised to hear that term used repeatedly during the past five years by various officials of the previous Democratic administration in the United States. For there to be a restoration, there has to have been an intervening revolution. It is hard to see one in effect, despite so much rhetoric of Machtpolitik in the air after 2001. As pleasing as that was to Talleyrand’s ears, there is little to suggest that a clean break has been made back to the nineteenth century. The red skein of legalism-moralism still prevails in most councils of state, including those ruling at Washington.
Rather than a restoration, we have the familiar revolving door. This time around, the door is a divided one. The perennial Secretary of State-in-waiting, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, has reportedly sided with Mrs. Clinton. What if she loses to Mr. Obama? Are there any embassies big enough for him? Perhaps there is only Tokyo, which he was slated to get before going to Germany in 1993. It is hard to make too much mischief in Tokyo.
We recall that Mr. Holbrooke was passed over for the job of Secretary before, and he is unlikely to let that happen again, even if it means switching sides. How strongly the passions of restoration run.
Mr. Obama’s most visible foreign policy advisers are Anthony Lake and Gregory Craig, both veterans of the Clinton administration. Either presumably would want to take over the State Department, although one suspects that Lake would prefer the Pentagon and Craig the National Security Council. Another leading candidate for State is Dr. Joe Nye. He too has cast his lot with Mr. Obama. The latter may feel pressure to choose a stronger personality—a Joe Biden or a Bill Richardson—but Talleyrand fears that his instinct, like that of his role model, Mr. John Kennedy, is to be his own foreign minister.
Mrs. Clinton, we daresay, is a different kind of manager. She does not seem to mind strong personalities so long as they do not compete with her for mastery of her favorite issues. International diplomacy does not seem to be one of them. A Biden or a Holbrooke would probably suit her fine in Foggy Bottom, with Ashton Carter or someone similar at Defense. The wild card is held by Al Gore’s former top lieutenants—Leon Fuerth, Graham Allison, et al. They cannot be expected to sit on the sidelines.
Talleyrand’s crystal ball would be under less strain if there was some indication that Mr. McCain and his Forward School had a clear restoration plan of their own in mind. Do they aim to bring back the era of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Luce, Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan? Will they invent their own Pacific Century and a new “global equilibrium”? Their ranks are probably just as divided. That does not bode well for a restoration; but it does for more of the same.
Friday, May 16, 2008
The Attack of the Primitives, Revisited
Professional diplomatists are offended by the idea that “talking” to one’s enemies is equivalent to a pre-emptive concession. Megaphone diplomacy of the kind practiced by George W. Bush recently, and by many others in his administration, is also a form of talking. In a more civilized era, this was once called “jawboning.” John F. Kennedy was particularly fond of it. It is certainly better than going to war.
Of course too much belligerent talk can backfire. Iran or Israel would not be the first country in recent history to launch an attack in order to defend a rhetorical position. How surprising that the Americans, who excel in poker, are proving to be such poor bluffers? We were led to believe that they won the Cold War in good measure by such talent. A good poker player always comes out ahead of a good chess player in time of war, however cold.
But brinksmanship is a deadly business. Better an enemy appeased, the British once said as regards their American and Russian rivals, than an enemy victorious. Lest Talleyrand be accused of posing as a Cold War revisionist, he refers here instead to the period 1895-1907, an underappreciated, golden age of rapprochement. Appeasement can be a good thing, in other words, if one cannot afford more than a couple of wars at a time. But this is an election season, alas. He (or she) who obliterates the fastest with the mostest wins.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Iran at the Center of the Universe
The Peacock Throne was once one of the most revered in the East. Even though it no longer exists in name, the mullahs of Tehran appear, by most measures, to have the same ambitions, namely, to rule their part of the world and all of the lesser civilizations therein.
Today the responsible Europeans and their occasional American ally do not wish to see the mullahs get their hands on nuclear weapons. That is certainly a worthy aim. Persians are wonderful, charming people but they have never done very well wielding great power. It is hard to say why, exactly, besides a sense of lost grandeur they seem to have suffered from the beginning of time. They will get their weapons, and may threaten to use them if doing so enhances their sense of power.
Threats or humiliation will not work to deter these people. Fortunately they have a volatile politics, and some healthy manipulation of it has already worked a bit, but not enough. The only thing to do is to find a way, somehow, to give them all the prestige they seek without the concomitant power. It is too bad our old friend General de Gaulle is no longer around. He might have been able to help.
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
African Tragedy
What is happening now in Zimbabwe has attracted the sympathy of your otherwise cold stone hearted correspondent. To see the once revered revolutionary Mugabe, now in his violent dotage, cling to power seemingly at any cost to his people. And then there is the consistent bravery of his opposition. It has all been quite predictable, of course. And so it will continue, until the end of his sentient life, which will probably come after he has exhausted the patience – and fear – of nearly everyone there.
Mugabe would have got nowhere without so powerful a drive to power. And yet what makes some men possess the good, tactical sense to step aside, however much they wield power from the sidelines? Mugabe is no Deng Xiaoping, Vladimir Putin or Nelson Mandela. He is ruthless, shrewd though by now probably crazy. His tyranny has become something worse than a spectacle – it is a burden. How long it will take his proud country to recover is anyone’s guess.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
The Return of Liberal Internationalism
Barack Obama’s speech today marked the most comprehensively self-conscious reassertion of American global ambitions since John F. Kennedy’s “bear any burden, pay any price.” It follows the best tradition of the New Frontier. Yet Talleyrand is skeptical. The speech lays out a series of policy preferences, objectives and goals. Does it constitute a new strategy as advertised? Reasserting leadership is not a strategy. Neither is working better with allies. The only strategic element on Mr. Obama’s menu is the redoublng of military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But that’s a regional strategy with global potential. Whereas his promise is cast the other way around.
A genuine global strategy for America in the 21st century is beyond the capacity of your humble correspondent. His gift is merely in manipulating the facts laid before him. One hopes, for the sake of his grand strategy and all that it promises for America and the world, that Mr. Obama is equally as talented.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Republicans on High
Something strange has been happening in the Himalayas. In the past few months the kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan became kingdoms no more, so to speak. Bhutan’s King Jigme agreed to cede his absolute rule in favor of a constitutional monarchy (thus remaining a king only in name); Nepal’s King Gyanendra gave up power altogether following a recent vote of his country’s parliament, a significant portion of which is controlled by Maoists.
The interesting thing about the two cases is that, by most accounts, the people of Bhutan love their monarchy while the people of Nepal are more ambivalent about theirs ─ or at least their latest king, whose own predecessors were gunned down by the then-crown prince.
Is this a harbinger of republicanism throughout Asia? Probably not. There are only a few monarchies left there, and most look pretty secure. But then who ever expected the Nepalese crown prince to murder nearly his entire family? Or the ruler of Bhutan to insist that his pristine, little kingdom, long proud of its isolation, begin to join the rest of the world in earnest?
Stranger things have happened. In both of these cases, it seems that the reasons had everything to do with internal politics. Still, they suggest something about the zeitgeist in the most remote lands on earth.
Friday, August 15, 2008
Second Chances
History has been kind to the United States, or, as Bismarck famously put it, God tends to “protect idiots, drunkards, children and the United States of America.” The USA no doubt has been given its share of second chances: after 1812 when it very nearly lost its independence; after 1865 when it came closest to self-destruction; after 1945 when its favored new world order, nipped in the bud by Hitler, Mussolini and the militarists of Tokyo, was given a second chance to thrive, and thrive it did.
What will people say about the period after 1989? Many Americans are scratching their heads today and asking themselves, we thought the Cold War was long over? It’s all about Islamists now. But here go the Russians invading their neighbors all over again. So the Americans continue with building missile defenses along the old Soviet perimeter; enticing its former republics to join NATO; badgering the Russians in fora large and small for every last political, moral and even commercial advantage.
Every few years or so a “who lost X?” campaign begins anew in the United States. Just when it finished asking who lost China, who lost Iraq and who lost Pakistan, Americans are now asking, again, who lost Russia. These oversimplifications seem impossible to resist. But seriously, is it worth asking whether the Americans failed in some way to convert their former enemy into an ally as they imagine themselves to be so adept at doing? Or were the Russians – wicked and opportunistic by nature – just biding their time, gaining stronger year by year?
The same thing could be, and has been, said about the Germans, Japanese and other defeated enemies. Whether or not the Russians really are so different and were bound to recreate their empire by force someday is not a question Talleyrand can answer definitively. But there is no doubt that the United States and its NATO allies lost an opportunity. During the past decade they have treated the Russians with a strange combination of condescension, flattery and passivity: acquiescing when they should have resisted, lecturing when they should have listened, and bullying when they should have sought convergence. Even the most sober ex-Cold Warriors now must be wondering whether Mr. Gorbachev should have put up more of a fight. It is hard to recall the last time so formidable an enemy was treated so dismissively in defeat.
Is it too late for a second chance to get the post-Cold War right? Not at all. Russians and Americans each have bigger fish to fry than to start a new round of proxy wars across Eurasia in the name of prestige and self-determination. Everyone, including the former captive nations, has more to gain if the two find a way to put the past behind them. But getting from here to there seems more challenging than ever. Americans are not the only ones who will need a good deal of Divine luck in the years to come.
Monday, August 11, 2008
A Dangerous Policy of Scold
Faced with demands to react to a crisis in the Balkans, Lord Salisbury once said that he did not endorse a “policy of scold.” Such is running rampant in recent days. Georgia has sought to punish the South Ossete and Abkhaz people for their disloyalty. Russia has sought to punish Georgian people and overthrow its government. Many thousands of people are now dead or displaced.
Nobody who has been paying attention to the former Soviet Union for the past several years should be surprised by any of this. And the fingers have begun to point. Some say Russia is to blame for over-reacting and using a long-standing crisis to reassert imperial rule. Others blame the United States and the West for any number of humiliations of Russia, the most recent being acceding to Kosovo’s independence and flirting with NATO membership for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. And some blame Georgia’s mercurial president, Mikheil Saakashvili for badly miscalculating the moment. It was he who, this time, got the ball rolling. In doing so, he reminds one of any number of other second-tier revisionists, from the Corcyreans to Josef Beck to Fidel Castro. Somehow these people always seem to find a way to connect their parochial crises to larger ones. They rarely come out the better for it.
So, Saakashvili punished the Ossetes; the Russians have punished him; and they may do worse in the days to come. And so the West will punish Russia, although how and to what extent remains to be seen. Nothing good can come of this. It has damaged the decade-long quest for a stable peace in the former Soviet Union. And it has reaffirmed Russia itself as a first-tier revisionist, and a most dangerous, power.
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
The Inscrutable Turk
Very little has been mentioned of Turkey in the outpouring of news and commentary about Russia’s rape of Georgia during the last two weeks. This is strange. For centuries, Russia’s drive to extend its authority to the south was premised in good part upon the need to contain Turkish power and to permit access to warm water ports. For all that Russia’s obsession with great power status has been depicted at the root of its latest campaign, many outsiders overlook the relative nature of their obsession. Russia’s rulers have sought not only to best the Germans, British and other European rivals but also, and more importantly in this case, have imagined themselves to be supreme over the Turks, Persians and other lesser infidels to their south and east.
Georgia and the other small nations of the South Caucasus have had an uneasy but generally workable relationship with Turkey, except of course for the Armenians, who historically have borne the brunt of Turkey's own drive for regional mastery. So how do the Turks regard Russia’s latest move?
There answer is something of a riddle. The Turkish government had been busy preparing for a visit by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, of all people, at the time of the invasion. It has since reportedly blocked passage of an American ship bringing aid to the Georgians. Otherwise it is playing its cards close to its vest. But there may come a day in the foreseeable future when the Americans and the Europeans will need Turkey if they really do aim to punish Russia for its Georgian adventure and deter it from further beligerence. No doubt the Turks will demand a high price.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Office Pool
It is that time of year again when mischievous minds begin to play musical chairs on the deck of the ship of state. Talleyrand assures all that he has no particular "inside information." These are only guesses for what people now like to call the "national security team":
Scenario A: Obama Victory
Secretary of State: Al Gore or Richard Lugar
Secretary of Defense: Tony Lake or Chuck Hagel
National Security Adviser: Greg Craig or Susan Rice
Ambassador to China: Richard Holbrooke
Ambassador to UN: Samantha Power
JCS Chairman: David Petraeus
Scenario B: McCain Victory
stay tuned...
Friday, September 12, 2008
Andean Mischief
It has been said that the Bolivian government has declared the American ambassador persona non grata. Now, this is a curious affair. What has the American, a certain Philip Goldberg, done to deserve such an indignity? He has evidently been too busy going after drugs and thugs in that obscure country, offending the locals by his righteousness and, more seriously, conspiring with opponents of the Morales government. This is hardly the first time such a thing has happened, and His Excellency is no doubt a good man. It is always tempting but risky to attack the American ambassador; one should really only do so (viz ‘Braden o Perón!’) from a position of strength. Mr. Morales may be sincere, passionate and, at times, astute. But his days are certainly numbered.
Monday, September 8, 2008
October Surprise
Talleyrand still finds himself in a predictive mood. He is wondering what will happen between now and the American presidential election in November. Surely something dramatic must happen with this cast of characters.
One likely event, he thinks, is the long-awaited capture of a senior al-Qaeda member somewhere in Pakistan. The recently publicized incursions by US special forces onto Pakistani territory—which we must assume have been happening under the radar screen for some time—may be just the beginning of the end for someone. Talleyrand’s sources tell him that the best candidate is the infamous Ayman-al Zawahiri. But we shall have to wait and see.
The impact on the US presidential election and around the world is unknowable. Something this dramatic need not necessarily energize the Republican party and its candidates, they who continue to urge a heavy focus on Iraq. Talleyrand has his doubts as to whether the executive powers that be really care about the political fallout. Like most lame-duckers, their thinking nowadays must surely be all about ‘legacy’. And we know from their own mouths that the one thing they claim to care about more than anything else is ‘leaving this place in better shape than the way we found it’.